Radical Constructivism and Cognitive Psychology
In contrast to what I normally do, namely choose a new piece of research and spread the word, here’s a blog about an article that turns 25 this year but which is still as relevant now as it was then!
John R. Anderson, Lynne Reder, and Herbert Simon’s 1998 article Radical Constructivism and Cognitive Psychology[1] delves deeply into the tensions between what they call radical constructivism (that was how it was known in 1998; reading the paper you can drop the word ‘radical’) and cognitive psychology, particularly within the context of educational theory and practice. They provide a nuanced critique of constructivism, arguing that while it has garnered significant attention in education, particularly in mathematics, it often misrepresents or oversimplifies the contributions of cognitive psychology and lacks empirical grounding.
In their words (p. 231):
Education has failed to show steady progress because it has shifted back and forth among simplistic positions such as the associationist and rationalist philosophies. Modern cognitive psychology provides a basis for genuine progress by careful scientific analysis that identifies those aspects of theoretical positions that contribute to student learning and those that do not. Radical constructivism serves as the current exemplar of simplistic extremism, and certain of its devotees exhibit an antiscience bias that, should it prevail, would destroy any hope for progress in education.
Constructivism, they explain is a philosophy or ideology which emphasises self-directed discovery and situates learning in complex, authentic contexts. It views knowledge as something constructed by the learner rather than imparted by an instructor. This philosophy aligns with ideals of active learning, individualised understanding, and the belief that students learn best when engaging deeply with material in meaningful ways. However, Anderson, Reder, and Simon contend that such an approach often overlooks critical insights from cognitive psychology about how humans learn, process, and apply knowledge.
Central to their critique is the assertion that effective learning depends on a balance between discovery and direct – I would call it explicit – instruction. They highlight the importance of structured teaching methods, deliberate practice, and the careful sequencing of tasks—practices grounded in robust empirical research then and even more so a quarter of a century later. Cognitive psychology, they argue, provides valuable insights into these areas by analysing how knowledge is acquired and structured, emphasising the importance of feedback, practice, and clear instructional goals.
The authors situate constructivism within a broader intellectual/philosophical history, linking it to figures such as Jean Piaget, John Dewey, and theories of situated learning (e.g., Lev Vygotsky). They acknowledge the influence of these thinkers on education but caution against adoption of their ideas without critical examination. For instance, while Piaget’s theories highlight the active role of the learner, they also emphasise the necessity of guided instruction and the interplay of assimilation (integrating new information into existing frameworks) and accommodation (restructuring frameworks when discrepancies arise). Similarly, they note that Dewey’s advocacy for experiential learning and less directive teaching does not justify abandoning systematic instruction and rigorous content knowledge.
One of their primary concerns with radical constructivism is its rejection of standardised assessment and objective evaluation. By dismissing such tools as incompatible with its philosophy, they argue, fails to provide a reliable basis for evaluating educational effectiveness. Instead, the authors advocate for a science of education analogous to evidence-based medicine, where interventions are rigorously tested and refined through empirical study. This would involve formative and summative assessments to identify what works, for whom, and under what conditions, rather than relying on philosophical or ideological assertions.
The authors also critique the notion, popular among some constructivists, that students must learn exclusively through discovery. “The defining feature of radical constructivism is the view that one cannot teach students but must allow them to create the knowledge that they need” (p. 238). They argue that this approach is not only inefficient but often counterproductive. Discovery learning can demand significant time and cognitive effort, with no guarantee of success, particularly for complex concepts. Explicit instruction, by contrast, can provide learners with the foundational knowledge they need to engage meaningfully in problem-solving and creative tasks, ensuring that time is spent effectively. They quote David Ausubel from 1968 (and it’s still the case almost 60 years later!):
Actual examination of the research literature allegedly supportive of learning by discovery reveals that valid evidence of this nature is virtually nonexistent. It appears that the various enthusiasts of the discovery method have been supporting each other research-wise by taking in each other’s laundry, so to speak, that is, by citing each other’s opinions and assertions as evidence and by generalizing wildly from equivocal and even negative findings.
Ausubel, D. P. (1968). Educational psychology: A cognitive view (pp. 497-498).Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Moreover, Anderson, Reder, and Simon challenge the radical constructivist emphasis on “authentic” learning situations, arguing that such contexts are not always ideal for mastering underlying cognitive processes. While embedding learning in real-world problems can sometimes motivate students, it can also overwhelm them with unnecessary complexity or distract from key learning objectives. The authors suggest that targeted, task-specific training is often more effective, particularly when learning requires mastering discrete skills or knowledge components.
Finally, the article critiques the tendency within radical constructivism to implement group work and social learning environments without sufficient evidence of their efficacy. While acknowledging the importance of collaboration in certain contexts, the authors emphasise that not all skills benefit from being taught in social settings. They warn against unstructured cooperative or collaborative learning, which can lead to issues like unequal participation and reduced individual accountability.
In conclusion, Anderson, Reder, and Simon call for education to shift from reliance on ideologically driven philosophies, like constructivism, to a foundation grounded in the science of cognitive psychology. They argue that the path to meaningful educational reform lies in integrating empirical evidence, cognitive task analysis, and deliberate practice into instructional design. By adopting such an approach, education can achieve the same kind of progress seen in medicine, moving from a reliance on anecdote and tradition to evidence-based practices that reliably improve outcomes. This, they assert, is the only way to break the cycle of untested educational fads and achieve lasting improvements in teaching and learning. Or in their own words:
If progress is made to a more scientific approach, traditional educational philosophies will be found to be like the doctrines of folk medicine: They contain some elements of truth and some elements of misinformation. This is true of the radical constructivist approach. Only when a science of education develops that sorts truth from fancy – as it is beginning to develop now – will dramatic improvements in educational practice be seen.
This was true in 1998 and, unfortunately is still the case in 2025.
[1] Anderson, J. R., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (1998) Radical constructivism and cognitive psychology. In D. Ravitch (Ed.). Brookings Papers on Education Policy (pp. 227-255). Brookings Institution.
